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The capability to maintain and sustain military forces in
peacetime deterrence and mobilization missions relies heavily
upon the continued availability of system components. Advanc-
ing technology threatens operating system and production sup-
port as older system designs become increasingly dependent
upon obsolete technology. This thesis focuses upon situations
in which the contracting officer is informed by the prime
contractor that a subcontractor no longer plans to continue
manufacturing a particular component needed to support a major
weapon system production line, and the alternative courses of
action which can be taken when this occurs. The study defines
the obsolescence problem and discusses why it occurs, des-
cribes current management initiatives and procedures to lessen
the impact, identifies advantages and disadvantages associated
with each alternative, and develops a formalized decision
process for problem resolution.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. FOCUS OF THIS STUDY
The capability to maintain and sustain military forces in
peacetime deterrence and mobilization missions relies heavily
upon the continued availability of system components. Advancing
technology threatens operating system and production support
as older system designs become increasingly dependent upon
obsolete technology. This study will focus upon situations in
which the contracting officer is informed by the prime con-
tractor that a subcontractor no longer plans to continue manu-
facturing a particular component needed to support a major
weapon system production line, and the alternative courses of
action which can be taken when this occurs.
B. OBJECTIVES
The primary intent of this research is to provide contracting
officers with an overview of the component obsolescence problem,
and to develop a formalized procedure for selecting the most
feasible available alternative. The study is organized to define
the problem and discuss why it occurs, describe current manage-
ment initiatives and procedures to lessen the impact, identify
the advantages and disadvantages associated with each alternative
and develop a formalized decision process for problem resolution.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
In consonance with the objectives stated above, the follow-
ing research question is addressed:
What are the principal alternatives available to the Govern-
ment to accommodate situations in which sources of supply
for major weapon systems components are no longer available,
and how might these alternatives be analyzed to result in
the best course of action?
In support of the primary research question, the following
subsidiary questions are addressed:
1. What are the typical conditions under which subcontractors
are no longer sources of supply for major system
components?
2. What alternatives are available to resolve the problem
of a subcontractor's discontinued production of a major
system component?
3. What are the key factors involved with selecting an
alternative source of production, and how should these
factors be used in the analysis?
4. What is the decision process that could be used in
selecting the best alternative?
D. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This study analyzes the problem of discontinued subcontrac-
tor production lines from the perspectives of the contracting
officer and the prime contractor. The information used through-
out this study was derived from personal interviews of contract-
ing, logistics , engineering, and production personnel at the
Naval Air Systems Command Headquarters (NAVAIR) and Grumman
Aerospace Corporation (GAC) , and telephone interviews with
project engineers from the Naval Avionics Center (NAC) and the
Naval Ocean Systems Center (NOSC)
.
The literature utilized in this study includes information
obtained from the Defense Logistics Information Exchange (DLSIE)
,
current Federal and Department of Defense (DoD) regulations
and supporting directives, previous theses, and a review of
current publications and periodicals relevant to the subject
of obsolescence.
This study has been designed as an inquiry to assist decision-
makers in choosing preferred courses of action by (1) syste-
matically examining alternatives for resolving the obsolescence
problem, and (2) selecting the most feasible alternative.
The researcher relied primarily upon information obtained
from NAVAIR and Grumman personal interviews. Interviewees des-
cribed specific situations involving obsolescence problems and
discussed alternatives available at the time of occurrence. The
researcher examined existing procedures for resolving the prob-
lem, as well as actions taken to resolve the problem which
appeared to deviate from established procedures. The generally
applicable considerations which comprise the major portion of
this thesis are substantially based upon actual obsolescence
problems experienced by NAVAIR and Grumman.
E. SCOPE OF THIS STUDY
This study is limited to an examination of problems asso-
ciated with subcontractor discontinuation of major weapon sys-
tem component production in the aerospace industry and its
subsequent affect on major weapon system production lines.
Illustrative examples are limited to microcircuit components
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which are considered to be vital to the uninterrupted flow of
major weapon system production lines, primarily F-14 aircraft
production. The selected components represent situations in
which criticality is a major factor. For example, the sub-
contractor is the sole source for the component, and the
production schedule will be affected unless action is taken.
Discussion of the various alternative solutions is limited
to actions which would be taken by the Government and/or the
prime contractor to resolve a particular production-related
problem. The process of identifying total system requirements
and coordinating the resolution decision with all affected item
managers is not within the scope of this study.
Although this study is limited to electronics parts obso-
lescence, it is intended to serve as a model for all components
acquired for production line support. The findings, conclusions,
and recommendations should be regarded as oriented toward the
overall problem, not limited only to electronics.
F. LIMITATIONS
No significant limitations were encountered during the
course of this research. It is felt that sufficient interface
with personnel who formulate and execute obsolescence procure-
ment decisions within the Department of the Navy was achieved
to ensure that the most salient concerns related to the purpose
of this research were addressed.
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G. ASSUMPTIONS
It is assumed that the reader is familiar with basic pro-
curement problems, basic naval terminology, and general con-
tracting and acquisition procedures for major systems.
H. DEFINITIONS
The format of this study includes relevant definitions
within the body of each chapter. Terminology associated with
the semiconductor industry is defined when considered necessary
to assist with the clarification of particular discussions.
Descriptions of electronic items or processes are provided at
a general, nontechnical level.
I. ORGANIZATION OF THIS STUDY
This thesis is organized for the reader to acquire a
general understanding of the nature and implications of the
obsolescence problem. Major research areas concern the impor-
tance of the problem, why it occurs, how it is currently managed,
a detailed discussion of available alternatives, and a recommende<
process for selecting the most feasible alternative.
Chapter II provides the necessary background for the estab-
lishment of a general setting for the focus of this effort.
Chapter III examines and discusses current policies and proce-
dures for managing the problem. Chapters IV and V analyze the
alternatives by using factors, and identify advantages and
disadvantages associated with each alternative. Chapter VI
offers a general decision-making strategy, and concludes with
12
a decision model which matches the available alternatives
with the decision-determining factors. The researcher's
conclusions, recommendations, and answers to the research




Though problems caused by the obsolescence of technologies
used in modern weapon systems are not new to acquisition and
logistics managers, the problems associated with the obsoles-
cence of microelectronic circuits are exceptionally acute due
to the rapid growth of semiconductor technology, and the exten-
sive use and dependence on microelectronic circuits in military
weapon systems [Ref. l:p. 1] .
This chapter will describe two main causes of microcircuit
obsolescence that affect the continued production of military
weapon systems. The first part of the chapter discusses the
different life cycle lengths of semiconductors and military
weapon systems, and the second part will describe the lack of
Governmental influence upon the semiconductor industry.
B. LIFE CYCLES OF SEMICONDUCTORS AND MILITARY SYSTEMS
In the context of this research, microcircuit obsolescence
occurs when the last known manufacturing source stops producing
a microelectronic component that is still needed to support
military weapon systems in production [Ref. l:p. 1] . This is
becoming an increasingly common occurrence because the produc-
tion life cycle for each type of integrated circuit (IC) is
approximately ten years, whereas the military may produce a
system dependent upon a certain type of integrated circuit for
14
15 to 20 years [Ref. 2:p. 7]. The reason that the production
life cycle for each type of integrated circuit is relatively
short is largely due to the rapid advance of integrated cir-
cuit technology. In a few years, the electronics industry has
advanced through a number of distinct technology phases. For
example, the vacuum tube was used extensively until 1947 when
the solid state transistor was developed. The transistor was
a "small, low-power amplifier that replaced the large, power-
hungry vacuum tube" [Ref.3:p. 63] . In 1959, the integrated
circuit was developed, and has subsequently progressed through
various levels of integration. The IC is composed of chips,
or dice (singular die) formed on a plane of semiconductor
material. In small scale integration (SSI) each chip contained
ten to twenty transistors designed to perform a specific func-
tion. [Ref. 4:p. 10] Within a few years, MSI (medium scale
integration) was replacing SSI. With MSI, the same size die
could contain hundreds of transistors with associated circuitry
required to perform more sophisticated functions. Next came
LSI (large scale integration) which is used widely in sealed
assemblies called hybrid microcircuits in which many chips can
be interconnected to form a sophisticated custom circuit for use
in a military system. [Ref. 2:pp. 2-5] LSI circuits contain
up to 250,000 components and perform extremely complex opera-
tions. The LSI microelectronic circuit category also includes
microprocessors. These are computer central processing units
on a single chip. [Ref. 4:p. 11] Additional technological
15
advancements include very large scale integration (VLSI) and
very highspeed integrated circuits (VHSIC)
.
Each phase of technology experiences distinct life cycle
stages. Leopold identifies the stages as [Ref. 5:p. 42]:







In the commercial electronics industry, "annual or biannual
redesigns are not uncommon" [Ref. 6:p. 8]. Commercial customers
are able to keep pace with the rapid advance of microcircuit
technology and purchase components in the first two life-cycle
stages when they are regarded as state-of-the-art. In contrast,
the Government has typically depended upon systems designed to
last up to 30 years. Though producers of military electronics
systems may have originally designed systems incorporating state-
of-the-art technology, they are forced in later years to become
dependent upon components in the decline and phase-out stages
because industry phases the older items out of production in
order to "place available engineering, design, and production
capability on current or projected technology" [Ref. 7:p. 21].
F-14 avionics, for example, reflect 10-15 year old designs, and
F-14 production line support problems are becoming increasingly
critical as the need grows to procure components which are




The contrast between the life cycles of individual types of
semiconductor technology and the Government's continued produc-
tion of systems designed with technology which is phased out
well before the system life cycle is complete makes it apparent
that electronic parts supplied for defense needs are going to
be behind current development [Ref. 6:p. 8].
C. GOVERNMENT INFLUENCE ON MICROCIRCUIT TECHNOLOGY
In addition to the disparity between component and system
life cycles, the microcircuit obsolescence problem currently
experienced by the military is partially caused by the recent
lack of Governmental influence on the direction of microcircuit
technology, and the small Governmental share of the microcir-
cuit business in comparison to the commercial share of the
market.
End markets for semiconductor products have changed since
the early 1960 's. At that time, military applications dominated
the field, military chips comprised 70 percent of the total
available market, and most integrated circuit development was
keyed to military needs. Specification, testing, and qualifi-
cation processes developed during that period continue to
influence today's semiconductor industry. [Ref. 9:p. 148]
Though direct military research and development funding
leveraged heavy corporate investment, the commercial marketplace
also contributed significantly to the large development costs
and the capital intensive manufacturing processes. There was
a situation of many sellers, many buyers and healthy competition
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The military not only influenced the direction of development,
but benefitted from the small, inexpensive, and increasingly
reliable high technology components which were developed as
a result of private sector demand. [Ref. 2:p. 4] Military
influence on the direction of semiconductor technology and pro-
duct definition had practically vanished by the 1970' s; the
Department of Defense share of the IC marketplace is currently
estimated at less than five percent [Ref. 2:p. 7]. An internal
document from Veda Corporation partially intended to summarize
the obsolescence problem identifies several reasons for the
reversal of market development control. These include the fact
that the DoD is supporting older technology not profitable for
the commercial sector to continue to produce, and the percep-
tion that the Government is not a good customer for the micro-
electronic circuit industry I Ref . l:p. 1] . Production runs are
low, Government specifications, regulations, and paperwork are
troublesome, profit margins are perceived to be low, and there
are sometimes payment delays [Ref. l:p. 2]. In addition,
the developers of new weapon systems normally require
specialized microelectronic circuits to maximize perfor-
mance or to provide unique features and capabilities, and
the microcircuit design and development process is charac-
terized by intellectual intensity with high front-end
costs for research and development. This further induces
microelectronic circuit manufacturers to focus their
resources in the more profitable commercial segments of
the marketplace. [Ref.l:p. 2]
The consequence of dwindling Government influence upon the
semiconductor industry is that commercial development efforts
focus upon commercial interests such as data processing, rather
than upon the Government's signal processing needs [Ref. 10 :p. 52
1!
D . SUMMARY
The occurrence of technology obsolescence is a natural
evolutionary process. "At some point in any produce life cycle,
demand will wane, with obsolescence just beyond the horizon"
[Ref. 10:p.51]. The problem has a particularly acute effect
upon the military because military systems are designed to
last for a period much longer than the semiconductor technology
life cycles. In addition, DoD is a low volume customer compared
to the commercial sector, and has recently had little influence




The dramatic growth in leading-edge semiconductor technology
has made it difficult for the military to obtain parts needed
to support military electronics systems. Parts rapidly becoming
obsolete are needed to support systems sometimes designed to
last 30 years. [Ref. 5:p. 42] The Navy has established micro-
circuit obsolescence management policy which defines the problem,
initiates a comprehensive management program, identifies alterna-
tive solutions to the problem, and encourages designing standar-
dization into future military systems.
The scope of this research limits discussion of the Navy
microcircuit management policy to Naval avionics associated
specifically with the production of major weapon systems. The
first part of this chapter will identify facets of the micro-
circuit obsolescence problem which prompted the issuance of
a comprehensive policy. Aspects of the Navy's microcircuit
obsolescence directive and established procedures relevant to
production line considerations will be highlighted in the second
part of this chapter, and the prime contractor's internal proce-
dures for assessing the impact of the problem and analyzing
various alternatives will comprise the third part. The chapter
will conclude with a description of activities performed by
the program office and the prime contractor to cooperatively
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coordinate problem resolution by selecting the "best" avail-
able alternative.
B. MANAGEMENT CONCERNS
The Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) Microcircuit Obso-
lescence Management Committee separated elements of the problem
into four general areas. These areas are identified and dis-
cussed below with particular emphasis placed upon their rele-
vance to the research questions.
1. Elements Related to the Problem
IC manufacturers terminate production of older, less
profitable microcircuit devices after approximately three to
five years of production; however, the devices need to be sup-
ported in NAVAIR systems for 10 to 15 years. NAVAIR must iden-
tify and analyze alternative solutions to the problem which
include finding another source, redesign, and a lifetime buyout
of remaining components. Analysis of solutions is frequently
timeconsuming, and implementation can be expensive. [Ref. 11]
2
.
Elements Related to Inadequate Communication
There is no way to predict with certainty when a particu-
lar component will become obsolete. IC manufacturers may provide
notification of plans to terminate production, but they have no
formal obligation to notify component users of planned production
termination, and the time provided between notification and
final production termination is frequently not sufficient to
allow analysis of the situation and implementation of an appro-
priate alternative. Additionally, IC manufacturers do not
21
always know who the component users are, and would not be able
to provide anything other than scattershot notification to
contractors who might be using the component in their systems.
[Ref. 11]
3. Elements Related to Inadequate Visibility
It is difficult to determine the composition of devices
in modules or assemblies stocked at other than the piece part
level. Non-repairable modules, contractor-supported assemblies,
most hybrid devices, commercial equipment, and systems not
organically repaired by the Navy do not have individual micro-
circuit component visibility to the Navy. This hinders the
search for substitutes or for other manufacturers who require
specifications to produce the component. [Ref. 11]
4
.
Additional Problems Related to Systems in Production
The program manager may be unaware of the system impact
which will be caused by the obsolescence of a particular micro-
circuit because there is no application visibility for that
particular component. Funding for the resolution of obsoles-
cence problems is unbudgeted and money necessary to implement
solutions, particularly life-time buyouts, must be redirected
from budgeted uses. [Ref. 11]
The problems cited above provide a brief synopsis of
the types of concerns the microcircuit obsolescence problem
evokes. Of critical concern is the possibility that production
line processes will be slowed or halted while solutions to
the problem are being analyzed and implemented.
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C. DIRECTIVES AND ESTABLISHED PROCEDURES
Recognizing the need to manage the microcircuit obsoles-
cence problem, the Navy established formal management policy
with the release of NAVMAT Instruction 4800.41, "Microcircuit
Obsolescence Management," dated 16 February 19 83. This instruc-
tion applies to the design, development, production and modi-
fication of major weapon systems and end items using microcircuit
components. It mandates the establishment of a centralized
management system to interface with industry, operate a micro-
circuit application data retrieval system and maintain long-
term microcircuit storage, and designates Commander, Naval Air
Systems Command (COMNAVAIRSYSCOM) as the lead systems command
for coordinating microcircuit obsolescence functions.
Specific program objectives cited in the instruction are to
[Ref . 12:p. 2]
:
1. Minimize the impact of production terminations of
microcircuit devices upon Navy systems through prompt and
timely action to ensure support of present and planned
requirements
.
2. Provide the means for identifying and/or verifying
microcircuit end item application in new and existing
Navy equipment through the development and operation of
a centralized computer data base.
3. Improve the timeliness of response to microcircuit
changes/deletions etc., received from manufacturers by
establishing procedures for proper assessment of available
alternatives
From the perspective of resolving production-related
microcircuit obsolescence problems, these objectives set the
stage for definitive programs designed to identify and document
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the microcircuit composition of Navy weapon system assemblies,
and to establish procedures for analyzing and selecting various
alternatives. As the designated lead systems command, NAVAIR
was assigned the responsibility to [Ref. 12:p. 3]:
1. Provide overall policy and guidance for the estab-
lishment and operation of the SYSCOMs ' microcircuit obso-
lescence management programs.
2. Serve as the single point of contact for interface
with the microcircuit industry.
3. Manage the development, implementation, and opera-
tion of a secured centralized data base system for obso-
lescence and related microcircuit technology issues for
use by all activities.
4. Support the development, establishment, and
operation of secured centralized long-term microcircuit
storage facilities for use by all activities.
As directed, NAVAIR initiated a comprehensive tracking,
control, and support system to deal with the microcircuit obso-
lescence problem. The program was developed by the Naval
Avionics Center (NAC) in Indianapolis, Indiana and is identified
by the acronym COMPRESS/ IMPACT which stands for COMmercial
PRoduction of Electronic Solid-state Systems Impact of Micro-
circuit Part Obsolescence on Avionics Critical Technology.
[Ref . 2 :p. 10] . The COMPRESS portion of the program relates to
engineering and application controls for new technology and is
beyond the scope of this research. The IMPACT portion of the
program is directly relevant to the program objectives and
NAVAIR responsibilities concerning production support obsoles-
cence problems, and provides a process to interact with IC
manufacturers, formalize an impending obsolescence problem
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notification system, identify microcircuit components in all
NAVAIR weapon systems, and determine and analyze appropriate
alternative solutions.
The IMPACT portion of the program relates to configuration
tracking and integrated circuit obsolescence warning notices.
NAC accumulates data concerning technology types, suppliers,
number of types, part numbers, and quantities of each type pre-
sent in each weapon replaceable assembly in NAVAIR weapon sys-
tems. This data is entered into the IMPACT high technology
data base. The data interrelate as much as possible to assist
with the determination of which weapon systems are affected by
the obsolete microcircuit. [Ref. 2:p. 12]
NAC personnel maintain close liaison with microcircuit pro-
ducers, and attempt to ensure that NAC is notified if plans
have been made to stop producing a particular microcircuit.
When informed that this situation will occur, NAC compiles as
much information as possible about the affected microcircuits
by searching the data base to determine which subsystems are
affected, and then issues a standardized notification to affected
users identified through the data base search. [Ref. 2:p. 14]
Two basic types of notification are issued, IMPACT Warnings
and IMPACT Alerts. If the producer is not the last known source,
IMPACT Warnings are issued to program and logistics managers
to report equipment and systems which use the microcircuits
terminating production. If the microcircuit producer terminat-
ing production is the last known source for the item, NAC issues
25
an IMPACT Alert to NAVAIR, NAVAIR field activities, NAVAIR
contractors, the Defense Supply System and all other interested
personnel identifying the specific impacted equipment. [Ref.
13] IMPACT Alerts are most relevant to the scope of this
research.
NAC ' s policy of closely interfacing with all avionics micro-
circuit producers ensures that the producer includes NAC when
notifying customers of production termination plans. Since
NAC and the customers learn of the manufacturer's decision at
the same time, the IMPACT Warning or Alert lags the initial
producer notification by the amount of time sufficient for NAC
to search the data base and compose the letter. The issuance
of the Warning and Alert notices signifies that the Government
is aware of the problem and has used the comprehensive micro-
circuit data base to identify affected equipment and users.
The NAC notifications may reach customers and users unknown to
the original producer, and provide application data relevant
to the situation which the original producer would not possess.
The prime contractor may receive word of the obsolescence
problem from an affected subcontractor and begin work on the
solution prior to receipt of the IMPACT Warning or Alert, and
may be able to resolve the problem without elevating it to
higher visibility. For example, it may be possible to con-
vince the producer to continue production, identify a substi-
tute, arrange to produce the product internally, or identify
and initiate procedures to contract for the requirement with
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another source. However, if the producer is the last source,
there will be no other sources. The prime contractor may
elevate the problem to the NAVAIR program office which should
have been alerted to the problem by the IMPACT Alert. The
program office utilizes technical, logistics and contracting
resources within NAVAIR to analyze the "problem, and considers
the prime contractor's recommended solution prior to making a
decision.
D. CONTRACTOR PROCEDURES
For the purposes of this research, the procedures that
Grumman Aerospace Corporation uses to analyze obsolescence
alternatives were examined. F-14 avionics reflect 10-15 year
old designs which are directly affected by potential production
line shutdown caused by the microcircuit obsolescence problem.
Grumman receives 40-50 IMPACT Warnings and Alerts per year and
approximately 25 parts per year affect the F-14 avionics.
[Ref. 8] The thoroughness of the analysis is frequently
affected by the amount of time between the producer's notifica-
tion and the established date for the last buy. There may not
be enough time to engage in comprehensive analysis. A short
time period in which to respond affects the time available to
effectively [Ref. 8] :
1. Perform the impact assessment,
2. Determine the preferred alternative,
3. Formulate a well thought-out recovery plan.
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Acting within these typical time constraints, Grumman
has a plan of action for assessing the problem. The following
is paraphrased from an inter-office memorandum [Ref. 14 :p. 1]
:
1. When notification is received that certain electronics
components vendors will not produce parts after a speci-
fied period of time, and lower-tier subcontractors have
"exhausted all internal resolutions to the problem
without success, Procurement shall identify the problem
for action.
2. "Engineering and Integrated Logistics Support (ILS)
shall conduct independent investigations to determine
if alternate sources or equivalent parts exist." If
alternate sources or suitable substitutes are found to
exist, engineering changes to accommodate the new
components will be initiated.
3. If no alternate sources or equivalent components can
be identified, the merit of redesigning the systems
affected by the obsolete component will be investi-
gated, as well as the feasibility of proceeding with an
"end-of-life" inventory procurement of the affected
components [Ref. 14:p. 2].
An examination of the foregoing procedures reveals that the
prime contractor's procedures are designed with two objectives
in mind:
1. Resolve the problem at the lowest sub-tier level possible,
2. Identify a solution which will least affect time, cost,
and system configuration.
Prior to identifying the problem for prime contractor action,
Grumman management personnel ensure that attempts have been
made to resolve the problem at the subcontractor level most
directly affected by the obsolescence problem. When the prob-
lem is elevated to the prime contractor level, efforts are first
made to identify alternate sources or suitable substitutes. The
last options considered are system redesign to accommodate
the use of alternate components and end-of-life buyout. This
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alternative consideration sequence matches increasing concerns
regarding time, cost, and system configuration which are dis-
cussed in detail in Chapters IV and V of this research.
Recommendations to proceed with an alternative involving
additional funding or configuration changes must be provided
to NAVAIR for use in making the final decision [Ref . 15]
.
E. RESOLUTION ACTIONS
The selection of the most appropriate alternative for re-
solving each microcircuit obsolescence problem involves the
consideration of recommendations from both the prime contractor
and organizational components within NAVAIR. Grumman submits
the recommendations to the program office, and the technical,
logistics and contracting areas of NAVAIR coordinate internally
to decide upon the best course of action. Alternatives range
from arranging for the prime contractor to produce the item to
utilizing or developing Government in-house manufacturing capa-
bilities. The most frequently suggested options for quick
problem resolution are buying out quantities expected to be
needed for the life of the system, and redesigning to accommo-
date the change. Other options requiring more leadtime include
emulation, competition, and development of an alternate source.
[Ref. 16]
The remainder of this thesis will discuss each of these
alternatives in greater detail by highlighting advantages,
disadvantages and considerations typically associated with each
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option, and presenting a decision process for selecting the
best alternative.
F. SUMMARY
The problems associated with obsolescence most relevant
to production concerns were identified as inadequate communi-
cation regarding notification of production termination,
insufficient time to conduct an analysis of the alternatives
prior to the "last buy" opportunity, poor visibility of com-
ponent composition, and uncertainty as to the system impact
of each obsolescence situation. As the designated lead systems
command, NAVAIR established a program entitled COMPRESS/ IMPACT
to foresee, mitigate and resolve obsolescence problems. The
IMPACT portion of the program provides for liaison with vendors,
the establishment of a comprehensive data base, and user noti-
fication of production termination and impacted systems and
equipment. At the time each obsolescence problem occurs,
alternatives for resolving the problem are identified, analyzed
and implemented before the system production line is forced to
shutdown. The prime contractor either resolves the problem
internally, or conducts as much analysis as possible prior to
elevating the problem to the program manager's level.
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IV. DISCUSSION OF ALTERNATIVES: SOURCE
SOLUTIONS AND ENGINEERING SOLUTIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter and the following chapter are intended to
provide a discussion and analysis of the most relevant alterna-
tives available to the program manager when the last known
source reveals plans to discontinue production. Alternatives
presented in these chapters are those which can be chosen at the
time the problem actually occurs. For discussion purposes,
they are grouped into four categories:
1. Source Solutions
a. original producer
b. contractor find another source
c. Government find another source












a. buyout production life-time quantity
b. buyout until redesign
c. buy semi-finished product
Each category is organized as a four-part section. The alterna-
tives are identified and discussed in the first two parts with
particular emphasis placed upon the perspective most useful
to the contracting officer. For example, the section on stock-
pile solutions focuses upon actual contracting problems encoun-
tered in the buyout process. The third part of each section
examines relevant factors to be considered in assessing each
alternative and the fourth part concludes the section by sum-
marizing advantages and disadvantages associated with the
alternatives. The discussion of categories has been split
between two chapters because the first two categories are closely
associated with the contractor's decision making process (with
the exceptions of competitive procurement, and Governmental source
development and in-house production) , and the last two categories
are generally resolved at a Governmental level.
B. SOURCE SELECTIONS
1 . Identification
a. Continue with Original Producer
The impending disruption of production line processes
will not occur if the original producer can be persuaded to
continue producing the obsolete component. This alternative
involves finding out why the subcontractor plans to phase-out
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production, and then negotiating an agreement which will moti-
vate the subcontractor to reconsider plans to cease production.
b. Contractor or Government Find New Source
The nature of component obsolescence generally
precludes the existence of other sources since obsolescence
is caused when the last remaining producer ceases production.
An attempt to locate other sources may be successful if speci-
fications are relaxed or requirements are modified. The search
for other sources is facilitated when the prime contractor has
originated the component specifications because the prime
contractor is familiar with potential sources and can tailor
the contract specifications accordingly. If the Government
has provided the specifications, the resolution will be ele-
vated to the Governmental level and competition will be utilized
c. Development of New Source
Developing a new source is closely related to find-
ing another existing source in the sense that contract modifica-
tions may be necessary to attract other producers. The source
can be developed by the Government or the contractor, though
it is assumed that Government funds will be used in either case.
d. Specialty House
Other sources may be discovered by seeking suppliers
who specialize in out-of-production components. These suppliers
generally buy the completed components for resale, but may
manufacture as well as distribute obsolete parts,
d. In-House Production
There are three types of in-house production:
33
(1) Government Owned-Government Operated (GOGO) facilities,
(2) Government Owned-Contractor Operated (GOCO) facilities,
(3) Prime contractor developed in-house capability.
2 . Discussion
Analysis of the source solutions category is suited to
progressive consideration of the various alternatives. Conse-
quently, the alternatives will be discussed in the sequential
manner that they might normally be contemplated.
The obsolescence problem usually surfaces at a subtier
level and each contracting tier attempts to resolve the prob-
lem before elevating it to the next higher tier [Ref. 17].
Upon encountering impending obsolescence, the affected higher-
tier contractor first determines why the subcontractor no longer
plans to produce the component. Macaruso identifies the most
common reasons as [Ref. 10:p. 50]:
a. Lack of a cohesive manufacturing standard for military
integrated circuits. Rigorous screening standards
often represent the only difference between commercial
and military products. These standards make it diffi-
cult for IC makers to automate processes and techniques,
and sometimes result in separately maintained military
and commercial production lines.
In a typical setting, a manufacturer [offering] 600
generic designs finds it necessary to create more than
100,000 unique part numbers just to account for differ-
ences in screening demanded by various military customers.
b. Inability to justify continued production of circuit
designs which are totally obsolete in the commerical
sector.
Methods to motivate the subcontractor to continue pro-
duction include relaxing screening requirements and providing
monetary compensation. Many military specifications and
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regulatory controls are based upon older technology and have
not been updated to deal with integrated circuitry. [Ref. 2:
p. 16] The contracting officer may find that it is possible
to relax certain screening requirements or specifications to
allow the subcontractor to match his defense work more closely
with commercial production. If the subcontractor's rationale
for discontinuing production reflects concern with producing
uneconomical older technology, it may be possible to convince
the subcontractor to continue production by offering increased
payment for perpetuating older technology. The additional cost
incurred as a result of this decision could be considered
temporarily acceptable if the reason for convincing the subcon-
tractor to continue production is to allow time to explore
less costly, more permanent solutions.
If the original supplier will not continue to produce
the item, the next logical step is to search for other existing
sources. According to a NAVAIR engineer, the prime contractor
is in an excellent position to do this because of extensive
familiarity with the industry and the existence of internal
investigative methodology [Ref. 18]. Research conducted at
NAVAIR and Grumman has indicated that the subtier contractor
most directly affected by the impending obsolescence generally
initiates the search for another source, especially if contrac-
tual agreements exist to provide the component to the next
higher level. Lack of success in locating a suitable source
causes the problem to be elevated to increasingly higher contract
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management levels where consideration is given to relaxing
specifications, modifying the requirement, or developing a
new source.
In today's procurement environment, competition must
be utilized when the obsolescence problem reaches the Govern-
mental resolution level. Initially, there may not be any
sources willing to compete for the requirement since only one
manufacturer is currently producing the component. The Govern-
ment can still find ways to stimulate competition by circulating
a technical data package; specifying a form, fit and function
application,- or modifying the requirement to accommodate producers
who could compete if particular modifications were allowed.
In spite of creative efforts to stimulate competition,
industry attitude concerning the advisability of producing
obsolete technology may become an unsurmountable impediment to
finding or developing a new source. As part of his memorandum
accompanying Recommendation 32 of the Acquisition Improvement
Program (AIP) , Deputy Secretary of Defense Carlucci said that
competition [Ref. 19:p. 10J :
reduces the costs of needed supplies and services,
improves contractor performance, helps to combat rising
costs, increases the industrial base, and ensures fairness
of opportunity for award of Government contracts.
However, a general conclusion drawn from the research
of Professors Greer and Liao is that when industry is prosper-
ing, attempts to stimulate competition do not necessarily reduce
costs because the contractors are not "hungry" for any type of
related work and prefer to selectively pursue desired business
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[Ref . 20] . Producing obsolete technology might not appeal to
the majority of potential sources if economic conditions are
favorable. They may either refuse to compete for the require-
ment, or demand monetary compensation not consonant with the
intrinsic worth of the component. These reactions undermine
expected benefits of competition, most notably reduced costs
and increased industrial base capability.
Other sources may also be discovered by seeking suppliers
who specialize in out-of-production parts, or by developing a
source of production either commercially or in-house. Leopold
has found that suppliers specializing in discontinued parts are
experiencing a brisk business [Ref. 5:p. 43]. Rochester Elec-
tronics, Inc., for example, currently maintains an inventory of
over 40 million parts, and Lansdale Transistor and Electronics
manufactures and distributes obsolete items. To develop manu-
facturing capability, Lansdale purchased manufacturing and
marketing rights to logic parts which are still used in mili-
tary systems designed in the 1970s. Purchasing arrangements
involve the transfer of the entire mask, assembly, test, burn-in
tooling and remaining inventory to Lansdale [Ref. 5:p. 43].
In-house production capabilities include current efforts by the
Naval Ocean Systems Center to set up a microcircuit production
line to reproduce certain types of industry production [Ref.
13] .
3. Factors to be Considered
The attempt to convince the original supplier to continue
production and the subsequent look into the feasibility of
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finding other sources are generally the first steps taken in
attempting to resolve the impending obsolescence problem.
Personnel interviewed at both NAVAIR and Grumman agree that this
approach causes the least disruption to current procedures,
but also acknowledge the difficulty inherent in finding another
source since the manufacturer causing the problem is generally
the last in the field. In determining whether the search for
another source will be successful or is worth pursuing, the
following factors are relevant to the decision. Factors are
restricted to "within category" analysis, and are oriented
toward production line considerations. Chapter VI of this study
will present factors relevant to "between category" analysis.




(2) duration of production
(3) design stability
b. Specification Problems
(1) complexity of system
(2) component composition
(3) proprietary data rights
c. Affect on System
(1) configuration
(2) test equipment







The factors in the first section relate to concerns which might
be used to favorably motivate current or other sources to pro-
duce the obsolete component. Factors in the second section
highlight contractual considerations which might be potential
problems if not effectively considered before a decision is
made, and the third section identifies factors which relate to
the actual weapon system and the test and support environments.
The fourth section considers the existence or feasibility of
particular alternatives and concludes with a discussion of time
and cost considerations. For convenience of discussion, factors
are occasionally combined.
One factor which normally would be considered in the
analysis of all four categories, type of technology, is limited
in influence by the scope of this research. As described in
Chapter II, the product life cycle moves predictably from state-
of-the-art to mature to old technology. Concurrent with the
technology evolution is the progression from many manufacturers
producing state-of-the-art components to fewer manufacturers
producing mature technology components to no manufacturers pro-
ducing old technology components (unless they are specifically
in business to specialize in old technology) [Ref. 16]. The
scope of this research is limited to situations in which the
last known source announces plans to phase-out production of a
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particular component. At that time, it it still within the
capability of other manufacturers to produce the component
though they may have shifted resources to accommodate more
current technology. The problem faced by the contracting offi-
cer is not whether existing manufacturers can produce the com-
ponent, but why they are not interested in producing it. The
type of technology germane to this research is mature technology
rapidly phasing into old technology,
a. Source Motivation
(1) Quantity Required and Duration of Production .
Macaruso states that given the choice between a commercial
opportunity with a 20 million unit per year potential and a
custom military design worth a 100,000 unit potential, it is
not difficult for the manufacturer to decide whose requirements
to produce [Ref. 10:p. 50]. This statement provides a compari-
son between the military and commercial IC market opportunities
when state-of-the-art technology is at its peak. Consider the
situation when the manufacturer no longer has the commercial
market, but the need to produce IC components for military re-
quirements continues. In this situation, quantity may not be
as important to the manufacturer as the amount of monetary com-
pensation since the quantity of microcircuit components tra-
ditionally procured by the military has seldom been significant
in relation to the manufacturer's commercial business [Ref. 6:
p. 8]. The quantity and duration of production could affect
the manufacturer's motivation in two ways:
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(a) The larger the required quantity and the longer the
period that the quantity will be required, the more
likely that a manufacturer will accept the commitment
to produce the component. [Ref. 19 :p. 16]
(b) The smaller the quantity, the shorter the period it
will be required, and the higher the compensation, the
more willing the manufacturer will be to produce the
component. [Ref. 16]
The first reaction takes into account the typical considerations
manufacturers think about prior to production commitment (suffi-
cient quantity, guaranteed business) , while the second reaction
considers aspects peculiar to the obsolescence problem, most
notably the reluctance to be committed to the production of
obsolete technology for an extended period of time. If the
manufacturer reacts in the latter manner, the contracting
officer could use the additional time gained from the short
period of low quantity production to explore other alternatives.
(2) Design Stability . The assurance that the sys-
tem and component design will remain stable will be a positive
consideration when the manufacturer is making a decision whether
to continue or to commence production. If the manufacturer
knows that the Government has no plans to discontinue producing
the weapon system using the component and that the subsystem
will also remain unchanged, the manufacturer will feel confident
that the requirement is virtually guaranteed on a longterm basis
b. Specification Problems
(1) Complexity of System . The contracting officer
will encounter increasing difficulty ensuring that contract
specifications are adequate while seeking other sources or
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developing a new source if the composition of the component
or the system with which it interfaces is complex. Modifica-
tions to requirements or the relaxation of screening requirements
could involve extensive and time-consuming investigation prior
to implementation, the intention to rely upon form, fit, and
function applications or dependency upon technical data packages
may be overly optimistic if technological "know-how" cannot be
successfully transmitted through written documentation, and
in-house production capability may not exist or be too costly
to develop if the component is particularly unique.
(2) Component Composition . It may not be possible
to determine the composition of the obsolete component. Plans
to use competition may be imperiled if the design data package
does not exist or is not updated. The component may also be
composed of various hybrids, each with unknown individual com-
ponent compositions.
(3) Proprietary Data Rights . If the design is
based upon privately-funded research and development, the
developer may be reluctant to release the design [Ref. 19:
p. 17]. This will cause problems in competing the requirement
if the technical data package approach is to be used. The
developer may be willing to release the technical data rights,
but at an unreasonable price that the Government cannot justify,
c. Affect on System
(1) Configuration. Configuration control involves
the systematic evaluation, coordination, and approval or dis-
approval of proposed changes to the design and construction of
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an item whose configuration has been formally approved [Ref. 21:
p. 40]. When modifying the requirement so that sources will
continue production or become willing to commence production,
configuration changes will have to be considered. Also, con-
figuration changes may be unintentionally implemented if the
winning contractor misinterprets the requirement.
(2) Test Equipment . An IC produced for the mili-
tary must "survive a punishing set of military screening re-
quirements, then a second set of incoming tests when it arrives
at the factories of most military prime contractors" [Ref. 10:
p. 53] . Modifications to screening requirements and specifica-
tion changes may limit the usefulness of currently used test
equipment. Consequently, it may be necessary to develop or
procure new test equipment to accommodate the component
modifications
.
(3) ILS Support . Macaruso states that the product
aging cycle creates headaches for logistics managers who main-
tain military electronics systems. "Since the military demand
cycle is often out of sync with the product life cycle . . . the
DoD often needs a chip after it has disappeared from the commer-
cial market" [Ref. 10:p. 51]. These headaches will be intensi-
fied by modifications intended to encourage other vendors to
compete for the requirement because logistics managers will be
responsible for supporting the newly designed system as well
as the original system.
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d. Other Considerations
(1) Availability of Specialty House . If the com-
ponent is carried by a specialty house, the most feasible
short-term action may be to buy a specified quantity to allow
time to consider longer-term solutions. The quantity onhand
at the specialty house, as well as the existence of other buyers
must be ascertained in order to know how long the supply will
last. There will not be a warranty if the specialty house
does not manufacture the item, and it may be impossible to
ascertain the reliability of purchased components without testing
each one individually.
(2) In-House Production . The existence of GOGOs
,
GOCOs, and prime contractor fabrication capabilities should be
investigated as well as the feasibility of setting up specialized
Government or contractor production facilities. These facilities
could be regarded as either short- or long-term solutions to the
problem. As a short-term solution, production could be terminated
when efforts to redesign the subsystem to accommodate current
technology have been completed. As a long-term solution, the
use of Government-funded production facilities will impede the
component's inevitable decline into obsolescence. Since this
alternative is usually costly and ensures a permanent supply
of certain obsolete components, the contracting officer must
ensure that the design is stable and that the components will
be needed in sufficient quantity and for a long enough period
of time to justify the expense and use of the facilities for
this particular purpose.
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(3) Time . The time period between notification
and actual production shutdown will influence the method used
to search for other sources as well as the decision whether or
not to use in-house production capabilities. It may be possi-
ble to convince the source to extend the time period until
alternatives can be fully investigated. Alternatives which take
the least amount of time are continuation with the same source
at an increased price and the prime contractor's search for
other sources. If the original source agrees to continue pro-
duction, negotiation of the additional compensation could be
quickly accomplished. If modifications to screening requirements
are involved, lengthy research and configuration approval
processes may be involved. The prime contractor's search for
other sources will proceed more quickly than a Governmental
search because the prime contractor can rely upon knowledge of
the industry and pre-established relationships with potential
sources whereas the Government is restricted to formally adver-
tised procedures. The in-house production alternative may be
the most time-consuming of all since feasibility research and
the modification or construction of production facilities must
be accomplished.
(4) Cost . Consideration of costs to be incurred
as a result of the source selection decisions depends to a
large extent upon the nature of the particular alternative and
the combination of actions required. For example, continuation
with the same source may simply involve additional monetary
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incentive, or it could involve costs associated with modifica-
tions necessary to influence the vendor to continue production.
Modification costs will include changes to test equipment which
may have to be redesigned to accommodate the component modifi-
cations, the cost of publications changes to document configura-
tion changes, and recurring and nonrecurring costs associated
with the actual modification. Qualification costs are usually
necessary when another source is selected, and nonrecurring
costs as well as qualification costs are involved with developing
a new source, especially if the new source designs the required
component. Use of competition may require the procurement of
proprietary data rights, and the costs of in-house production
capability could range from modification of existing facilities
to complete construction of new facilities.
4. Advantages and Disadvantages
The advantages of seeking to maintain the same source
or of finding other sources include:
a. Continuation with the same or slightly modified technology,
b. Allowing time to prepare for a long-range solution (i.e.,




a. Cost of financially incentivizing the existing source,
b. Nonrecurring costs and qualification expense involved
with selecting a new source,
c. The availability and cost of proprietary data rights,
d. Contract specification difficulties due to uncertain com-
ponent composition, and/or outdated or non-existent
data packages,
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The attempt to replace the obsolete component with
one which performs the same or similar function.
b. Emulation
Process of producing electronic items which will
perform the same function as the discontinued item with the
same form and fit [Ref . 22] . There are several types of emu-
lation. The first concerns the development of a new integrated
circuit device that can be mask-programmable to replace the
obsolete function in technologically obsolete devices. Another
type of emulation involves redesigning and replacing obsolete
components on one printed wiring board with a new board con-
taining components with new technologies so that the second
board is form, fit and functionally identical to the first.
A third type of emulation involves hybrid microcircuit technolo-
gies to be used to provide form, fit and function replacement
parts [Ref. 2:p. 17]
.
c. Redesign
Changing the design of either the obsolete component
or the subsystem with which it interfaces to allow the intro-
duction of technology considered more enduring than the obsolete
technology. For the purposes of this research, the term "rede-
sign" will refer only to subsystem redesign, since component
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redesign essentially resolves the obsolescence problems by
introducing new technology and requires the adaptation of
system interfaces to the design.
2 . Discussion
Configuration control involves the systematic approval
or disapproval of proposed changes to the design and construc-
tion of an item whose configuration has been formally approved
[Ref. 21:p. 40]. Analysts seeking a solution to the obsoles-
cence problem want to cause as little disruption to the affected
system as possible. Therefore, the thought processes involved
in an analysis of engineering solutions progress logically from
changes which least affect system configuration to those which
most affect configuration. Methods of resolving the obsoles-
cence problem having the least affect on configuration include
substitution and emulation. Engineering personnel interviewed
at NAVAIR and Grumman concur that the first engineering reaction
to an obsolescence problem is to investigate possible component
substitutes. If no substitute is available, emulation might
be considered next [Ref. 2:p. 17]. Though an intriguing and
promising idea, NAC personnel acknowledge that avionics emulation
has not been used with any substantial amount of success to date
[Ref. 13]. NAC resources are available to assist with identi-
fying substitutes for microelectronic components or determining
the feasibility of emulation. The Navy Program Manager's Guide
lists Navy-sponsored research laboratories, areas of research
concentration, and procedures for tasking the laboratories to
assist with particular problems [Ref. 23:pp. 2-18].
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If substitutes cannot be found and emulation is not
technically or economically feasible, redesign to accommodate
newer technology becomes a viable technical alternative to con-
sider. Redesign will affect configuration and requires for-
malized documentation. Accounting for configuration changes
is accomplished through the use of Engineering Change Proposals
(ECP) . There are two types of ECPs: Class I and Class II.
An engineering change is classified as Class I when there is
an effect on the functional configuration identification, the
product configuration identification as contractually speci-
fied, and/or technical requirements contained in the product
configuration identification. These technical requirements
include performance outside stated tolerance, interface charac-
teristics
,
and reliability, maintainability, and survivability
outside stated tolerance. [Ref. 21 :p. 44] A more complete
listing of the elements within Class I classification categories
can be found in Hallums [Ref. 21:pp. 44-45]. An engineering
change is classified as Class II when it does not fall within the
definition of a Class I change. Examples include a change in
documentation (correction of errors, addition of clarifying
notes) , and a change in hardware (substitution of an alternative
material) which does not affect the factors listed under Class
I. [Ref. 21:p. 45]
NAVAIR personnel interviewed stated that Class II changes
can be made at the contractor level, are relatively inexpensive,
and the least disruptive to overall system considerations. A
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Class I change, on the other hand, involves significant expense,
impacts configuration dramatically, and is time-consuming to
approve and implement. [Ref. 16]
3 . Factors to be Considered
Factors applicable to the analysis of engineering solu-
tions are identical to those involved with source solution
decisions because a relevant option in source solution analysis
involves modification of the component's or subsystem's charac-
teristics to maintain or stimulate interest in the production
of obsolete technology. However, alternatives within the
engineering solutions category are less sensitive to manipulative
tactics than those within the source solution category. For
example, the source solution alternatives can be made viable
by financially motivating manufacturers to produce obsolete
technology, relaxing screening requirements, or implementing
amenable modifications, whereas, in the case of engineering
alternatives, a substitute is or is not available and emulation
is or is not feasible. There is no way to change these basic
technological limitations. Consequently, the factors have
been divided into two sections:
a. Limitations upon Alternatives
(1) quantity
(2) design stability
(3) duration of production
(4) complexity of system
(5) composition of components
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Factors included in the first section represent limitations im-
posed upon particular engineering alternatives due to the nature
of the component or situation. Effects upon the system and
support environment are included in the second section. Since
the choice of a specific engineering alternative is fairly
rigidly controlled by circumstance, the applicability of particu-
lar factors to the most relevant alternatives will be discussed
in narrative format under the appropriate heading,
a. Limitations upon Solutions
As noted previously, the technology relevant to
this discussion is limited by the scope of this research to
mature technology which is rapidly phasing into old technology.
At the point in time when analysis of various available alterna-
tives commences, one source still exists and other sources have
just recently phased-out production of the affected component's
technology to concentrate on state-of-the-art pursuits.
Impressions derived from interviews are that the existence of
one remaining source and the fairly recent participation of other
sources in the production of the obsolete technology provides
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more opportunities to identify substitutes or to develop
emulation capabilities than if old technology were involved.
The availability of substitutes will depend upon the
complexity of the system and component composition. The more
complex the system or varied the component composition, the
more likely that a substitute will not be found to match the
required function, or emulation will not be technologically
possible since there will be too many design and performance
variables [Ref. 16]. It may be necessary to purchase proprietary
data rights to determine the actual component composition. Emu-
lation will prove particularly costly and time-consuming if
techniques must be developed for individual applications.
According to the NAC obsolescence brochure, rede-
sign of the subsystem to accommodate new technology should be
the last alternative selected after attempts to find substi-
tutes have failed and emulation has been determined techno-
logically or economically not feasible [Ref. 2:p. 17]. The
reasons are that redesign is time-consuming, costly and affects
the system configuration. Before deciding to redesign, long-
range system plans such as quantities required, duration of
production, and design stability must be considered. If the
system design is stable and expected to be in production for the
foreseeable future, substitutes are not available, and emulation
is not feasible, redesign may be the only option which will
guarantee the perpetuation of the system.
The time available before production shutdown will
influence the amount of research effort which can be accomplished.
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A check for the availability of substitutes can be performed
relatively quickly compared to the time it will take to emulate
or redesign the component or subsystem. Cost will depend upon
the alternative chosen and the combination of actions required.
In general, substitution will be the least costly since the
substituted component will interface with the same subsystem
as the obsolete component, and redesign of the subsystem will be
the most expensive since interfaces and publication changes are
affected. The cost of emulation varies with the chosen appli-
cation and availability of techniques but emulation through
redesign is considered "too costly to serve as a new source of
discontinued parts" [Ref. 5:p. 43].
b. Effects on Systems
Initial attempts to use substitution and emulation
are motivated by the desire to disrupt system configuration
as little as possible. Progression from substitution and emula-
tion solutions requiring no interface modifications, to the need
for slight interface modifications to full-fledged subsystem
redesign to accommodate new technology results in increasingly
major effects upon system configuration. Requirements for
configuration change approval, publication changes, and the
adaption of system test equipment to interface with the rede-
signed subsystem must be met, and logistics support becomes
increasingly complex. If the decision is made to retrofit the
change, plans must be made to change the designs of all exist-
ing subsystems. A decision to forward fit the change will
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result in the need to support the subsystems currently opera-
tional as well as the subsystems incorporating the design
change. [Ref. 15]
4 . Advantages and Disadvantages
The advantages to engineering solutions include:
a. Continuation with existing subsystem configuration if
use substitution or emulation,
b. Redesign will result in the development of a system
using more enduring technology than the replaced
obsolete technology.
The disadvantages include:
a. Configuration changes to component when substitution
or emulation are used, and configuration changes to the
subsystem when redesign is implemented to accommodate
different technology,
b. Costs of emulation and redesign,
c. Time it takes to emulate or redesign may cause problems
with production line continuity.
D . SUMMARY
Categories discussed and analyzed in this chapter have been
identified as Source Solutions and Engineering Solutions. They
have been grouped into one chapter because most of the alterna-
tives within both categories are initially analyzed and some-
times resolved at the contractor level. For example, the
decisions to continue with the existing source, find another
source, identify a suitable substitute or initiate a Class II
engineering change are often made by the prime contractor.
Other alternatives are significantly analyzed at the contractor
level prior to elevation to the program manager. The next
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chapter will focus upon categories of alternatives whose nature
forces immediate elevation to the Governmental level.
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V. DISCUSSION OF ALTERNATIVES: SYSTEM
SOLUTIONS AND STOCKPILE SOLUTIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter is intended to discuss and analyze the system
and stockpile solutions to the obsolescence problem created
when the last known source for a particular component plans to
cease production. Each solution category is divided into four
sections: Identification, Discussion, Factors of Considera-
tion, and Advantages and Disadvantages. Though initially
considered at the prime contractor level, alternatives within
each solution category are ultimately resolvable at the Govern-
ment level. System solutions require the use of Government





In the context of this research, cannibalization is
the process of taking components or subsystems needed for pro-
duction from an existing system with the intention of using
the cannibalized items to prevent production line shutdown.
b. Navy Supply System
When a weapon system is placed into operation, pro-
visioning and inventory controlling mechanisms within the
supply system ensure that an appropriate number of system spare
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parts will be onhand to support the system during its life.
Production requirements are satisfied separately through contrac-
tual arrangements with vendors. The Navy supply system alterna-






When faced with an impending obsolescence problem and a
very short timeframe within which to react, the options of
cannibalization or using the supply system assets may appear
attractive. If the urgency of the situation is such that vir-
tually no time exists to explore other alternatives and the
production line is in imminent danger of shutting down without
the required component, there is justification in investigating
the use of these alternatives [Ref. 15]. However, personnel
interviewed stress that these two solutions do not solve the
problem satisfactorily and are useful only as very short-term
solutions until thorough analysis can be performed to deter-
mine a more permanent resolution to the problem.
3. Factors to be Considered
Since system solutions are considered of short-term
benefit and are selected quickly to satisfy an impending crisis
situation, factors considered prior to making the decisions are
relatively basic. The following three factors should be
examined prior to taking cannibalization or system solution
action:
a. Time before production is affected. If there is a
distinct possibility that the weapon system production
line processes will halt or be severely constrained
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without the obsolete component, locating and acquiring
a sufficient quantity of components may be the fastest
way to prevent this occurrence. Satisfaction of
immediate production requirements will allow time to
consider more permanent alternatives.
b. Availability of components in supply system. System
stock must be checked to ascertain if the required
component is carried in the supply system. Problems
may be encountered from system stock managers who will
want to analyze the effect of reduced stock levels
on projected fleet support requirements.
c. Availability of systems to cannibalize. The term
"cannibalization" is generally construed to mean
cannibalizing parts from the same organizational
unit's assets [Ref. 15]. Locating systems to canni-
balize may result in consideration of inoperable units
placed in long-term storage, or units not under specific
organizational control. In the past, parts have been
taken from Naval Air Rework Facilities' (NARFs) dis-
assembled aircraft inventories, and replaced before
aircraft are reassembled.
Cannibalization and the utilization of system assets
are not normal procedures taken to satisfy production require-
ments. Consequently, there are no formalized procedures for
taking this course of action. [Ref. 15] The program manager
must call upon "behind the scenes" management skills to accom-
plish either of these actions. Arrangements for component
payback will inevitably be involved.
4 . Advantages and Disadvantages
The advantages to using cannibalization or system
assets include:
a. Almost immediate access to urgently required components,
b. Assurance that production line processes will continue
until longer range solutions can be investigated.
Disadvantages include:
a. The fact that these solutions are short-term and do not
materially contribute to the resolution of the obsoles-
cence problem,
b. Possible negative effect on the supply support system
by significantly reducing assets intended for fleet
usage
,
c. Possible negative effect on fleet readiness by canni-
balizing components necessary for operational availability
C . STOCKPILE SOLUTIONS
1. Identification
A life-of-type buy is the one-time purchase of enough
items to completely support the weapon system for the remaining
life of the system. It is more commonly referred to as a
"buyout" [Ref. 24 :p. 1]. For the purposes of this research, three
types of buyout are considered: buy all anticipated production
requirements, buy enough items to sustain production until the
system is redesigned, and purchase the semi-finished product




It is the policy of the Department of Defense that a
life-of-type buy for a "quantity of secondary items no longer
to be produced shall be made only when all other more economical
alternatives to a material shortage or manufacturing phaseout
have been exhausted" [Ref. 24:p. 1]. Interviewees stated that
reasons for this policy can readily be seen from noting problems
faced concerning buyouts for production line support. These
include the following items.
a. Estimated Quantities
The DoD as a whole has not demonstrated a consistent
capability for accurately determining life-of-type buy
requirements within the time limits imposed by manufac-
turers' phase-out decisions. . . . Contributing factors
include the lack of comprehensive end item application
data and the difficulty in predicting equipment life. [Ref. 17:
p. 5]
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Estimating production requirements is based primarily upon the
Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP) . With the exception of multi-year
procurement, firm contracts for requirements are annual so exact
quantities are known only on an annual basis. For these reasons,
estimating how much to buy to satisfy production requirements
for a system cannot be exact and this potential for waste is
cited as a reason for analysts to seek other more cost-effective
solutions. [Ref. 24:p. 2]
b. Government Furnished Materials (GFM) and Storage
To avoid the overhead added to buyout quantities
when the prime contractor purchases the quantities through
several tiers of subcontractors, the Government may decide to
"breakout" the component from the contract and directly buy
out the manufacturer. This action eliminates Government reli-
ance upon the contractor to manage the routine elements of
providing production support components, and generates manage-
ment, storage and warranty problems for the Government . For
example, the GFM must be provided to the contractor in guaran-
teed working condition at the right time and to the right place.
Since quantities may need to be stored for several years prior
to use, it may be difficult to ensure that the components are
good. Storage of microcircuits may create problems if con-
trolled environments are required. [Ref. 25]
c. Funding
Funding procedures for life-of-type buys are des-
cribed in the DoD instruction concerning life-of-type buys and
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require that the integrated material manager (IMM) fund the
portion of the buy required for initial spares for replenish-
ment stockage for the life of the item, and the end item program
manager fund the portion of the buy to be used as government-
furnished material (GFM) for new production of end items.
The end item program manager passes the funded requirement to the
IMM who includes these requirements in the system life-of-type
buy. [Ref. 24 :p. 2] The basic problem with this procedure
is that the program manager will not have funds specifically
available for life-of-type buys because obsolescence problems
are unfunded. Budgeting for obsolescence problems would be an
admission that the potential problems were not foreseen in
the design phase.
The optimal point for addressing the problem is in the
equipment design stage. . . . The use of "preferred for
new design" parts and standard electronic functions con-
stitutes the most viable approach to avoiding obsolescence
problems by limiting the variety of electronic part
styles and types. [Ref. 7:p. 6]
Telephone interviews with Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP)
management personnel revealed no sympathy for the obsolescence
predicament they believe could have been planned for during
the system design phase [Ref. 26].
d. Prime Contractor Buyout
Many manufacturers give six months advance notice when
a product or product line will be discontinued ....
Research required to determine a means of support, along
with a cost analysis, cannot always be compressed into
this timeframe. [Ref. 17 :p. 69]
Procedures discussed in Chapter III require that the prime
contractor analyze the situation internally and present
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recommendations to the program manager. The program manager
ensures that contracting, logistics and technical personnel con-
sider all available information and determine the course of
action to be taken. Interviews with NAVAIR and Grumman per-
sonnel have indicated that if the program manager's decision
is not given to the prime contractor prior to the buyout date,
the prime will react to protect the production line by buying
estimated quantities required for projected production requirements
and then request reimbursement from the Government. Usually,
the prime contractor will plan for the funding to be covered
in subsequent contracts; however, a change in Governmental
requirements may leave the prime with excess quantities onhand.
Buyout for production support is a particularly
fertile area for the Government and the prime contractor to
face conflict over established obsolescence policies. This
conflict is generated if the timeframe provided by the manu-
facturer between notification and final buyout opportunity
is narrow. This section will focus upon production support
problems related to buyout by providing two examples when the
prime contractor bought out the manufacturer prior to receipt
of Government authorization. An example showing cooperation
between the Government and the contractor to resolve the prob-
lem will conclude the section.
(1) Example 1: Teledyne Systems Company . This
example is intended to illustrate why the prime contractor
felt the need to buy out the manufacturer prior to Government
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authorization, how the requirements were estimated, how the
prime contractor expected to cover the costs internally,
why the Government ended up reimbursing the prime contractor,
and specific problems which concerned the Government during
the reimbursement negotiations.
In 19 84 Teledyne Systems Company notified Grum-
man that Motorola, a lower-tier contractor, would cease produc-
tion of MSI dice needed to support Computer Signal Data
Converter (CSDC) production fo the F-14A. Grumman notified
NAVAIR of the problem, and ASO was also alerted by Teledyne.
Grumman commenced an in-house analysis of alternatives and
considered:
a. Procurement of MSI dice through alternate sources,
b. Replacement of MSI dice with equivalent parts,
c. End-of-life procurement from Motorola, either by
Grumman or Teledyne.
Grumman internal memoranda stressed the need for more time
to thoroughly analyze the alternatives, but stated that enough
research was conducted to make the decision that the EOL buy
was the most practical approach.
Not having received authorization from NAVAIR,
and concerned with the obligation to stockholders to ensure
production line continuity, Grumman authorized Teledyne to buy
anticipated FY 86 through FY 89 requirements. The Five Year
Defense Plan (FYDP) was used to estimate the quantities required,
Grumman incurred a $2 million termination liability which was
expected to be reduced upon receipt of the FY 86 F-14 Advance
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Acquisition Contract. In this case, Government reimbursement
would not have to be separately funded, but could be included
in subsequent contracts. However, the number of F-14As required
was subsequently reduced, and Grumman was left with more com-
ponents in inventory than would be needed to satisfy produc-
tion requirements. Faced with a request to reimburse Grumman
for the entire amount, Government negotiators were reluctant
to reimburse the entire amount since Grumman ' s buyout action had
not been authorized by the program manager. The Government
preferred to pay for the MSI dice as they were used. Final
settlement of the issue resulted in Grumman being reimbursed
for the entire amount, and the excess components placed into
the Navy supply system. The action was considered to be in
the best interest of the Government.
(2) Example 2: Sundstrand Data Control, Inc .
This example provides an instance when estimates of the buyout
quantity cannot be used because production lot size dictates
the actual quantity to be procured, shows how overhead applied
by subtier contractors affects the ultimate price, and con-
cludes with total Government reimbursement.
In this case, the manufacturer forced the
subtier contractor to buy a quantity which exceeded foreseen
production requirements because the units had to be produced
in a particular lot size. Sundstrand Data Control, Inc., bought
1,200 integrated circuits from Signetics when only 200 were
needed. The $15 original unit price had $41 Sundstrand overhead
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added when purchased by Grumman. Again, the Government origin-
ally negotiated to pay for the components as they are used,
but eventually agreed to fund the entire amount.
The resolution of the funding problems in the
examples cited above leaves the Government with several unique
considerations regarding contractual arrangements. When the
Government agrees to reimburse the contractor for the buyout
quantity, contractual arrangements concerning warranty of GFM
involve the prime contractor becoming the overseer of the
Government bonded warehouse where the units are stored. The
warranty obligation is assumed by the prime contractor. In
this manner, the Government is not bound by the customary GFM
storage, delivery and warranty obligations. [Ref. 25]
(3) Example 3: Purchase of Semi-Finished Product .
This example illustrates cooperative efforts among Government,
contractor, and supplier personnel to resolve an impending obso-
lescence problem. The supplier was persuaded to extend the
shutdown date so that sufficient time would be available to
analyze alternatives, and a relatively unique solution was
proposed and implemented as a result of the extensive analysis
and cooperation. It was decided to buy the semi-finished
products, store them for future need, and then contract for
the assembly of the finished product when needed.
In 19 83, a supplier informed Grumman 6-8
months in advance of plans to stop producing a particular
microchip. It was estimated that an engineering change would
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cost $20 million, and a decision to buy and store the
finished product was determined to be too expensive since
estimates of future use were uncertain. The decision to buy
the wafers, a circular board containing hundreds of identical
dice, and store them in a sealed, dry nitrogen, high security,
blast proof storage vault at NAC took over a year. One of the
more unique contracting problems encountered concerned esti-
mating the yield for each wafer. Yield had to be considered
from cutting up the wafer, moving the dice to the integrated
circuit, and moving the integrated circuit to the board. The
contractor extended the shutdown date to accommodate the deci-
sion after noting the extensive effort being taken to resolve
the problem. Now, once a year, a year's worth of production
supply and spares wafers are sent to General Instruments for
subcontractor assembly. NAC has expanded its wafer storage
to storing wafers for ASO, NAVSEA, and the Army.
3 . Factors to be Considered
Buyout is used to procure enough components to last
for the life of the system or to sustain production until
redesign can be accomplished. Factors to consider in making
the "within category" analysis are grouped as follows:
a. System Stability
(1) stability of design
(2) duration of production
(3) quantity





(3) composition of components




Factors discussed in the first section have previously been
included as decision factors in source solution and engineering
solution analyses, and relate specifically to aspects of the sys-
tem which must be considered before the buyout option is chosen.
The nature of the buyout procedure necessitates the inclusion
of the second section entitled, "Material Considerations,"
which is oriented toward purchase, storage and warranty problems,
and cost and time are included in the third section as additional
relevant decision factors. The "Effect on System" section included
in previous analyses is omitted because the purpose of the
buyout procedure is to preserve the system in its current state.
The only effect on the system may be the logistics problems
of storing and delivering the buyout quantities, and these
aspects will be discussed in the second section,
a. System Stability
( 1 ) Stability of Design and Duration of Production .
These factors relate to the length of time the existing design
is expected to be used, and the time period over which the system
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utilizing the affected component is to be produced. The
objective of the buyout alternative is to provide the re-
quired number of components for the time period needed. Plans
to redesign the subsystem or replace the affected component
with a new design will affect the amount of time the buyout
quantity will be useful, as well as the planned length of pro-
duction for the system.
(2) Quantity . The determination of an accurate
buyout quantity will depend upon the time period over which
the components will be used. Plans to redesign the subsystem
or to replace the component with a new design must include
implementation dates so that buyout quantities intended to
sustain the system until the change is completed may be accurately
estimated. Estimating quantities for a lifetime buyout will be
hindered by the lack of firm plans to continue producing the
system beyond the projections contained in the FYDP . Even when
it is possible to attain a reasonable estimate of required
quantities, the manufacturer may be unwilling to produce the
exact amount due to lot size requirements or a perceived uneco-
nomical production run.
(3) Complexity . If the component is considered
complex, system designers may be influenced to buy a life-time
supply rather than disrupt the component and subsystem designs
with increasingly intricate changes. Complexity will also
affect quantity estimation procedures. A larger percentage




(1) Shelf-life and Storage . Buying a sufficient
quantity of material to last for the estimated production period
may necessitate storing the components or unpackaged devices
for an extensive period of time. The length of time that these
components can be expected to remain operable, as well as the
need for a controlled storage environment must be considered.
If arrangements are not made to store the components at the
contractor facility, the Government will be responsible for
delivering operable components as required. The storage of
unpackaged devices will require the establishment of a con-
tract for periodic assembly and delivery.
(2) Component Composition and Proprietary Data
Rights . Knowledge of the component composition will assist
with the determination of shelf-life and storage considerations.





(1) Time . This factor refers to the length of time
available between notification of impending production shut-
down and the "last buy" date. The amount of time available
to decide upon a course of action will influence the analysis
to determine whether buy out until redesign, life-time buy or
the purchase of unpackaged devices is the most feasible approach
Time will also influence the accuracy of the quantity estimates.
(2) Cost . If the prime contractor makes the life-
time buy through subcontractor tiers, the cost will include
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the actual cost of the component plus added overhead at each
tier. Additional costs are storage, purchase of too many
components due to mandated production lot sizes or FYDP changes
to defense requirements, and the price of warranties and/or
proprietary data rights. The purchase of unpackaged devices
will require subsequent assembly charges.
4 . Advantages and Disadvantages
The advantages of buyout includes
a. Expediency of quickly procuring enough items to pre-
clude the possibility of production line shutdown,
b. Capability of continuing the same configuration.
The disadvantages of buyout include:
a. Difficulty in estimating exact quantities required
for future production needs since contracts do not
exist for future end-item requirements,
b. GFM storage and warranty problems when the Government
purchases the items,
c. Prime contractor motivation to buy out the subcon-
tractor prior to receiving Government authorization
and then requesting reimbursement for the entire
quantity,
d. Obtaining relief from GFM warranty requirements when
the prime contractor buys out the vendor.
D. SUMMARY
This chapter concludes the discussion and analysis of the
four categories of alternatives identified in Chapter IV.
Each category has been discussed and analyzed separately,
and factors considered particularly relevant to the analysis of
"within category" alternatives have been identified and discussed.
The following chapter will provide an approach for "between
category" analysis.
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VI. COMPARISON AND SELECTION OF ALTERNATIVES
A. INTRODUCTION
Four categories of alternatives to be considered in the
resolution of the obsolescence problem as it relates to major
system production were presented in the preceding two chap-
ters. Within each category of alternatives, factors were
identified to assist with the analysis of each alternative.
The first part of this chapter summarizes the significant
features of the "within category" decision process. The
second part of this chapter identifies factors which are to
be used in the analysis of alternatives "between categories."
The chapter concludes with a decision model and example for
its use.
B. "WITHIN CATEGORY" FEATURES
Previous chapters have shown that "within category" analy-
sis is primarily a process which moves logically from alterna-
tives which least disrupt current procedures to those requiring
progressively significant adjustment to procedures or configura-
tion. For example, an analysis of the source solution alterna-
tives initially considers continued use of the same source.
If this is not possible, a search for another source is conduc-
ted—first by the contractor, and then by the Government. The
availability of specialty house assets and in-house Government
or contractor manufacturing capability is assessed, and the
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final recourse is to develop another source or in-house produc-
tion capability. The relative feasibility of each alternative
can be manipulated by offering the original contractor more
money, modifying requirements to attract other manufacturers,
or relaxing specifications. In contrast, the engineering solu-
tions are more rigidly limited by technical qualifications.
As substitution, emulation and redesign are investigated, they
must be accepted or rejected based upon technological feasi-
bility. System solutions provide another example of alternatives
which are either possible or not possible, depending upon the
availability of components within the supply system or the
existence of systems potentially available for cannibalization.
Stockpile decisions are dependent upon the situation, and include
buying a small quantity until redesign is accomplished, pur-
chasing the entire quantity needed for the anticipated production
life- time, or buying the semi-finished product. Table 1 provides
a summary of "within category" alternatives.
Factors represent circumstances existing at the time the
obsolescence problem occurs which will influence the choice of
"within category" alternatives. For example, the willingness
of the original supplier to continue production, or the availa-
bility of a substitute makes both of these alternatives feasi-
ble options. A combination of circumstances further guides
the selection of particular alternatives within each category.
For example, a short time-frame within which to make the deci-


















Develop New Source Redesign
Specialty House
In-House Production
Source: Developed by researcher
component will cause the "buyout until redesign" option to look
very attractive.
C. DISCUSSION OF "BETWEEN CATEGORY" FACTORS
The use of "within category" alternative analysis may result
in the selection of one or more feasible solutions from each
category. However, a method is also needed in order to make
a "between category" selection. This section identifies and
discusses five factors which directly influence the choice of
an alternative both within and between each category. These
factors are: (1) time, (2) stability, (3) cost, (4) quantity,
and (5) complexity. As will be seen in the subsequent analysis,
these five factors incorporate all of the factors discussed in
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Chapters IV and V, except the specialized factors related to
the "supply system" and "cannibalization" alternatives. Each
factor is defined, and alternatives which are most likely to
be chosen due to particular characteristics of the factor are
weighted. To avoid obscuring the following presentation, only
two characteristics have been identified for each factor. For
example, time is either short or long, a system is either stable
or not stable. The (+) weight indicates that the alternative
will be chosen if the particular factor characteristic exists,
and the (-) indicates that the alternative will not be chosen
if the characteristic exists. The (0) implies that the alterna-
tive may or may not be chosen. The decision model combines
the five factors and the alternatives into a matrix in which
each alternative can be assessed based upon the (+) , (-) and
(0) weighting indicators.
Table 2 illustrates the completed matrix. The assignment
of weights is based upon the researcher's analysis of interviews
and written material presented in Chapters IV and V of this
study. The discussion which follows explains why particular
weights have been chosen for each alternative/factor relation-
ship. Clarifying examples are presented to facilitate assign-
ment of weights. Though it is acknowledged that actual
situations may be much more complex than those presented below,
the relative simplicity is necessary to illustrate the basic
mechanics of the decision model. Qualifying explanations are




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































in reclassification. Little comment is provided if the weight
assignment is evident based upon the discussion and factor
sections of Chapters IV and V of this study.
1. Time
The manufacturer's announcement of impending production
shutdown includes a time period between customer notification
and the "last buy" date. The length of this period will
influence the time available to conduct an analysis of the situa-
tion, consider all possible alternatives, and select and
implement the alternative. The time for which the selected
alternative will be useful is considered under the "stability"
factor.
If the time period is relatively short (less than two
months), alternatives will be chosen which can be implemented
rapidly. These will consist of options in which the product
is already available, or can be modified and produced quickly.
Alternatives with a (+) indicator include:
(1) Original Producer,
(2) Contractor Find Another Source.
Convincing the original supplier to continue produc-
tion could be accomplished quickly if additional compensation
is all that is required. Contract modification or the relaxa-
tion of specifications may require more time. If the prime
contractor has originated the specifications, modifications
could be specifically targeted toward potential suppliers. The
prime contractor may also be able to rapidly find other sources
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Components are potentially immediately available with
each of these alternatives. Problems may be encountered with
insufficient quantities, or the reluctance of asset managers
to allow fleet support components to be used for production.
(7) Buyout Life-Time Production Quantity,
(8) Buyout Until Redesign.
These alternatives can be implemented immediately because
the manufacturer usually offers one "last buy" opportunity.
However, the decision to buyout until redesign, or buyout to
end of production requires time to accurately estimate required
quantities
.
If the time period is long, alternatives may be chosen
which will allow time to compete the requirement, set-up produc-
tion facilities, emulate, or redesign the subsystem. The (+)
alternatives include:
(1) Government Find Another Source,




(6) Buy Semi-Finished Product.
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The two (-) alternatives, "supply system" and "canni-
balization," are not considered desirable solutions and are
never chosen if time is sufficient to allow the exploration
of other alternatives. The (0) alternatives, "original
producer," "contractor find another source," "specialty
house," and "substitution" are not excluded from selection;
however, the long time period enables the additional consider-
ation of the above-listed alternatives. This would not be
practical if sufficient time was not available to implement
the alternatives.
2 . Stability of Design
For the purposes of this analysis, stability involves
the amount of time production will continue without changing
the system design. It includes the "duration of production"
factor described in Chapters IV and V. If the system design
is considered stable, alternatives may be considered which will
represent long-range solutions to the problem. These (+)
alternatives include:
(1) Original Producer,
(2) Contractor Find Another Source,
(3) Government Find Another Source,






(9) Buyout Production Life- time Quantity,
(10) Buy Semi-Finished Product.
Using the same component, finding a substitute, buying
a sufficient quantity to last for the life of production, or
emulating the integrated circuit's form, fit, and function
are all solutions intended to allow the system to continue un-
changed. Developing a new source or in-house production capa-
bility, and arranging for emulation imply serious interest in
sustaining the technology beyond its normal period of decline.
The system will be considered not stable if there are
plans to stop system production or to redesign the component
or subsystem. In this case, short-term solutions will be
preferred:
(1) Original Producer.
This alternative is a short- or long-term solution.
The original supplier could be convinced to extend production
until other alternatives can be considered, or to agree to
continue providing required quantities indefinitely.
(2) Cannibalize,
(3) Supply System,
(4) Buyout until Redesign.
The (-) alternatives represent options which are taken
to sustain the system. If the system will not be in production
much longer, or the component or subsystem is to be redesigned,
these alternatives would not be practical.
79
3. Cost
This factor includes all costs typically associated
with each alternative and includes integrated logistics support,
test equipment and configuration change factors discussed in
Chapter IV. Since obsolescence is unfunded, consideration must
be given to whether a low or high cost solution is involved.
The need to continue supplying the item for an anticipated
lengthy production life may justify a greater investment than
the need to use the component for a relatively short time period.




(2) Contractor Find Another Source.
These alternatives allow procedures to continue virtually
unchanged. The only costs might include additional compensation,
and costs associated with modifications.
(3) Specialty House.
This option allows the purchase of the item "off-the-




(7) Buyout Until Redesign,
(8) Buy Semi-Finished Product.
The (-) alternatives, "develop new source," "in-house
production," "emulate," "redesign," and "buyout production
life-time quantity" are never considered low cost options.
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"Government find another source" is either a low or high cost
alternative, depending upon the nature of the costs involved.
A high cost solution will be considered feasible if
plans are to continue using the component for an indefinite
period of time, or if no recourse exists but to redesign
to accommodate different technology. Alternatives include:
(1) Contractor Find Another Source,
(2) Government Find Another Source.
Costs may involve the acquisition of proprietary data
rights, changing specifications, different test equipment,






(7) Buyout Production Life-Time Quantity.
The (-) indicates options which will not be chosen as
high cost alternatives because they involve purchasing the
same or similar items. The (0) alternatives, "buyout until
redesign," and "buy semi-finished product," may or may not be
chosen as high cost" alternatives, depending upon the quantity
required and the cost of each item.
4 . Quantity
The quantity required will determine the amount of
effort needed to resolve the problem. For instance, a small
quantity may be needed if there are plans to redesign the
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subsystem or to replace the component. In this case, short-







(5) Buyout Until Redesign.
The (-) alternatives will not be chosen because "Govern-
ment find another source," "develop new source," "in-house
production," "emulate," "redesign," "buyout production life-
time quantity," and "buy semi-finished product," are solutions
implemented when the quantity is sufficient to justify expendi-
ture of funds, effort and time. The (0) alternatives may or
may not be chosen, depending upon the circumstances. For
example, it may be relatively easy for the contractor to find
another source or for a substitute to be located.
If the quantity is substantial, it will be sensible
to either plan for a long-term supply of the items or to rede-
sign the subsystem to avoid the problem. The (+) alternatives
include
(1) Original Producer.
This alternative is applicable as a long-term solution
if the supplier can be convinced to continue production on a
long-term basis. If the supplier is not willing to produce the
item indefinitely, this alternative becomes short-term.
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(2) Contractor Find Another Source,
(3) Government Find Another Source,





(9) Buyout Production Life-Time Quantity,
(10) Buy Semi-Finished Product.
A continued need for large quantities justifies the
exploration of all alternatives except the (-) options of
using supply system assets or cannibalization. These are not
considered acceptable permanent solutions to the problem.
The (0) option, "specialty house," may or may not be chosen de-
pending upon the amount of assets on hand and the ability of
the specialty house source to continue providing the item.
The other (0) alternative, "buyout until redesign," will only
be considered if the quantity required before redesign is
substantial.
5. Complexity
This factor also includes the factor, "component com-
position," previously discussed in Chapters IV and V, and in-
volves problems encountered with attempts to successfully
duplicate the component. If the component is not considered
complex and all hybrid aspects of the item are identifiable,
(+) alternatives may include those which strive to continue
utilizing the same or similar component. These include:
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(1) Original Producer,
(2) Contractor Find Another Source,
(3) Government Find Another Source,







(11) Buy Semi-Finished Product.
If the component is not complex, modifications may
be relatively simple to implement, specifications are less
likely to be misunderstood by potential sources, similar items
may be available, and remanufacture, emulation, or buying the
semi-finished product for future assembly are more likely to
be successful.
A complex component or subsystem could stimulate two
courses of action. It may be considered desirable to continue
with the existing or similar component to avoid the possibility
of being unable to successfully duplicate the item. On the
other hand, it may be prudent to obviate anticipated future
problems by taking the opportunity provided by the obsolescence







(5) Buyout Production Life-time Quantity,
(6) Buyout Until Redesign.
The use of the (0) alternatives, "contractor find
another source," "Government find another source," "develop
new source," "in-house production," and "emulation" is possi-
ble with complex components and subsystems. However, there
is risk that the complexity will make it difficult to success-
fully implement these alternatives. "Supply system," or
"cannibalization" may be chosen depending upon component availa-
bility in the system, and buying the semi-finished product
is highly dependent upon characteristics of the component and
the feasibility of assembly at a later date.
As is probably suspected, the process of weighting
alternatives in relation to factors is far from definitive. A
slight change in circumstance, or a more extensive definition of
a particular alternative could easily result in reassignment
of weights. Consequently, the generalized thought process
outlined above can only serve as a guideline for the weighting
of specific alternatives based upon an actual situation.
D. DECISION MODEL
During the course of this research, alternatives have been
grouped into four categories. Two of the three phases for
the selection of feasible alternatives to resolve the obsoles-
cence problem have been presented. The first phase demonstrated
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that logical thought processes and the existence of particu-
lar circumstances largely dictate the choice of feasible alter-
natives within each category. Relevant factors were used to
analyze the alternatives within each category. The second
phase identified factors which were perceived to be common to
all categories, and offered a method for weighting the
alternatives in relation to the factors.
The third and final phase provides a methodology for select-
ing alternatives which are most likely to remain as feasible
solutions after all circumstances existing in a particular situa-
tion are considered. The weight assignments from Table 2 will
be utilized in this methodology. In order to use the decision
model (Table 2) , the circumstances of a particular obsolescence
case must be determined. For example, the last known source
plans to cease production in two months, there are no plans to
replace the component or to redesign the system, the component
is not considered complex, required quantities are substantial,
and funding is not available. In this case, the applicable
characteristics will be short time, stable, low cost, not com-
plex and large quantity.
There are three steps for progressively narrowing the
range of available alternatives when considering a particular
situation. First, the (+) , (.-)## and (0) weights from Table
2 for each alternative are summarized at the far right of the
model. (Table 3 illustrates this procedure.) Alternatives
with any (-) indicators will be excluded from further con-
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generated through combined assessment of the five factors.
In this example, the (-) alternatives, "Government find another
source," "develop new source," "in-house production," "emu-
late," "redesign," "buyout production life-time quantity,"
and "buy semi-finished product" will not fit the short time period
allowed for analysis and implementation. Cannibalization and
using supply system assets are never considered appropriate
permanent solutions, and "buyout until redesign" is not a
rational decision because there are no plans to redesign the
system. Alternatives with (+) and (0) indicators include
"original producer," "contractor find another source,"
"specialty house," and "substitute." The second step involves
determining which of those selected ( + ) and (0) alternatives
is most appropriate by considering the relative importance of
particular factors. For example, if time is considered more
important than the other four factors, there may be some alter-
natives with (0) indicators in the short time column which
would be considered less desirable than those with (+) indica-
tors. In this example, all alternatives originally selected
because of their total of five (+) and (0) indicators have (+)
indicators in the short time column, and no further elimination
can be made by examining the most significant factor. The
third step for narrowing the range of alternatives involves
examination of the "within category" selection thought process
explained in Chapters IV and V. The first three alternatives
with (+) and (0) indicators are "original producer," "contractor
find another source," and "specialty house." These are from
the Source Solution category. Following the order of con-
sideration previously explained in the first part of Chapter
IV, an effort should first be made to see if the original pro-
ducer can be persuaded to continue production. If not, then
the prime contractor should attempt to locate another source,
and the availability of a specialty house should be assessed.
Concurrent with this decision process, the feasibility of the
fourth alternative, "substitution," from the Engineering
Solutions category can be explored.
The capability to select one of these alternatives depends
upon the willingness of the original supplier to continue
production, and the actual availability of another source, a
specialty house, or a substitutable item. If more than one
of these alternatives is possible, consideration must be given
to circumstances peculiarly unique to the situation and to
the conditions inherent in each alternative. For example, the
original producer may be willing to continue production for only
a short time. Since the component will be needed for a much
longer period, selection of a substitute might be a better long-
term choice. Perhaps the prime contractor has found another
source, but will have to make configuration changes to interest
the source in producing the item. In this case, the intrica-
cies of configuration change must be weighed against implemen-
tation implications of the other possible alternatives. Use
of the model assists with narrowing the range of available
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alternatives to those most suited to the particular circum-
stances. However, judgment is still required to make the final
selection. There are too many circumstantial variables to
enable final alternative selection to be made entirely through
the use of a model.
E . SUMMARY
The model presented in this chapter provides a method for
analyzing and selecting "between category" alternatives. The
assignment of weights to each factor is a subjective process
based upon analysis presented in Chapters IV and V. The choice
of alternatives is guided to a significant extent by a com-
bination of circumstances surrounding each particular situation.
The model condenses the circumstances into five factors, arrays
the alternatives from all four categories, and weights the
alternatives in relation to each factor characteristic. The
assignment of weights enables the assessment of the overall
applicability of each alternative to specific obsolescence
situations. The model allows the consideration of the rela-
tive importance of each factor to particular obsolescence
situations, and enables the identification of the most feasi-
ble alternatives in light of combined circumstances.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
As a result of this research, the following conclusions
have been drawn.
Obsolescence is a problem which affects the uninterrupted
continuity of major weapon system production . As discussed
in Chapter II, technology life cycles are significantly shorter
than major weapon system life cycles. Component producers
predictably phase-out production of older technology items
to concentrate upon more profitable newer technology products.
As a result, the decreasing availability of required components
threatens major weapon system production line continuity.
Procedures for the identification, analysis and selection
of alternative solutions to the obsolescence problem are not
structured . As explained in Chapter III, current procedures
are directed toward identifying affected systems and notifying
users and producers that obsolescence is pending. The affected
managers possess general guidelines for approaching problem
resolution, but have no structured procedure which accommodates
the methodical identification, analysis, and selection of
alternative solutions.
Alternatives can be categorized, and a hierarchical deci -
sion thought process can be distinguished within each category .
Chapter IV identifies the categories as: Source Solutions,
Engineering Solutions, System Solutions, and Stockpile Solutions
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Chapters IV and V illustrate that, within each category,
consideration of alternatives progresses from the least to
the most disruptive impact upon the system and current
procedures
.
It is possible to use a decision model to assist with the
resolution of particular obsolescence problems . A decision
model has been developed in Chapter VI which can be used to
eliminate inappropriate alternatives and to select those most
suited to the particular situation.
Established procedures are often too time-consuming to
allow adequate analysis of all options prior to the "last buy"
opportunity . Problems which cannot be resolved at the prime
contractor level are elevated to the program office where
logistics, engineering and contracting personnel analyze the
situation, decide upon a solution, and then inform the prime
contractor as to the selected course of action. Experience
has shown that the program office analysis often extends past
the "last buy" date, no uniform decision is provided to the
prime contractor, and the prime contractor feels compelled to
act independently to protect the production line.
The need to resolve the obsolescence problem quickly may
preclude the consideration of alternatives which take time
to analyze and implement . A short time between notification
and "last buy" date will cause alternatives involving the
development of a new source, in-house production, emulation,
and redesign not to be considered.
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS
As a result of this research effort, the following recom-
mendations are presented.
An array of possible alternatives, advantages and disad-
vantages associated with each, and a decision process to
assist with initial analysis should be available to each
functional area tasked with participating in the decision process
Awareness of a range of potential solutions will expand each
analyst's perception of the obsolescence problem, and allow
the consideration of various alternatives to be conducted
from a broader perspective than would be possible if only
the most immediately apparent options were examined. A list
of most common alternatives, factors associated with their
analysis, and a decision model have been presented in Chapters
IV, V, and VI of this study. This analysis of solutions to the
obsolescence problem is intended to provide a useful base for
identifying possible solutions, analyzing their applicability
to particular situations, and selecting the most appropriate
alternatives
.
The analysis of alternatives should be started when the
original producer is still contemplating discontinuing an item,
and has not officially announced a final production run date .
The opportunity to effectively identify, analyze, select, and
implement feasible alternatives hinges upon the time provided
between the producer's notification of plans to cease produc-
tion and the "last buy" date. It is crucial for Government
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and prime contractor personnel to ensure that this time period
is as extensive as possible . Efforts must be made to encourage
the producers to notify designated Government activities if
they are even contemplating discontinuing an item. By shoulder-
ing the overall coordination responsibility, the activities can
determine if the producer is the sole source, notify all users,
and stimulate the analysis of alternatives well in advance of
the actual production phase-out. This will allow the considera-
tion of options normally excluded from analysis due to limited
time to react.
Coordinate the decision process within the program manager's
office so that a definitive answer is provided to the prime
contractor before the "last buy" date . When the problem is
elevated from the prime contractor to the program office,
the maximum amount of time which can be taken to resolve the
problem should be noted. The program manager should immedi-
ately task logistics, engineering, and contracting personnel
to consider the feasibility of available options. As soon as
possible, and especially before the "last buy" date, the program
manager should meet with representatives from each area,
select a solution, and notify the prime contractor as to the
decision.
C. SUMMARY OF ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The answers to the primary and subsidiary research questions
are provided below.
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Primary Research Question. What are the principal alterna -
tives available to the Government to accommodate situations
in which sources of supply for major weapon system components
are no longer available, and how might these alternatives be
analyzed to result in the best course of action ?





b. Contractor find another source
c. Government find another source








a. Navy supply system
b. Cannibalization
4. Stockpile Solutions
a. Buyout production life-time quantity
b. Buyout until redesign
c. Buy semi-finished product
Analysis of alternatives has been accomplished through the
use of factors. Factors considered relevant to each category
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of alternatives have been identified and discussed in Chapters
IV and V. Chapter VI has consolidated the factors into five
general areas which represent combined circumstances surround-
ing particular obsolescence problems. Alternatives which favor-
ably withstand scrutiny from the perspective of these
circumstances (time, stability, cost, quantity, and complexity)
are considered viable options to consider as solutions to the
obsolescence problem. Further analysis of these alternatives
is accomplished by examining the progressive decision process
inherent within each category of alternatives. Final alterna-
tive selection ultimately remains a process highly dependent
upon judgment, yet the use of factor analysis provides valuable
guidance for approaching the problem with an overall perspec-
tive, and assistance with eliminating alternatives which are
not feasible.
Subsidiary Research Question #1. What are the typical
conditions under which subcontractors are no longer sources
of supply for major system components?
Chapter II has explained that life cycles of technologies
are much shorter than the life cycles of major weapon systems.
Consequently, sources of supply for major system components
cease production of items which have passed the "maturity"
phase of the life cycle, and concentrate upon producing com-
ponents which represent the state-of-the-art in the industry.
In the case of the semiconductor industry, Government require-
ments comprise a small, noninf luen tial share of the total
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market. Microcircuit component producers do not find it
profitable to continue supplying components needed by major
weapon system producers when total market demand for these
items is diminishing or nonexistent.
Subsidiary Research Question #2. What alternatives are
available to resolve the problem of a subcontractor's discon-
tinued production of a major system component ?
A listing of available alternatives is provided as part
of the answer to the primary research question. These
alternatives are defined and discussed in Chapters IV and V.
Subsidiary Research Question #3. What are the key factors
involved with selecting an alternative source, and how should
these factors be used in the analysis ?
Alternative sources have been categorized in Chapters IV
and V, and key factors relevant to their analysis have been
associated with each category. These factors are as follows:
quantity, duration of production, design stability, complexity
of system, component composition, proprietary data rights,
configuration, test equipment, integrated logistics support,
time, cost, availability, shelf-life, and storage. These fac-
tors are used to draw attention to all aspects of each alterna-
tive prior to deciding that the alternative should be selected
as the best solution to a particular obsolescence problem.
Subsidiary Research Question #4. What is the decision
process that could be used in selecting the best alternative ?
Chapter VI describes a decision process which could be
used. Five factors (time, stability, cost, complexity, quantity)
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have been selected which represent combined circumstances
surrounding a particular obsolescence problem. These factors
are weighted in relation to each alternative. Alternatives
with a total of (+) and (0) weights are considered potentially
feasible. The identification of one particular circumstance
which is more significant than the others will sometimes enable
further reduction of potentially feasible alternatives. The
last step in the decision process is to examine the progressive
thought process inherent in each category of alternatives, and
to select alternatives which are actually feasible given the
circumstances
.
D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
This study has identified and discussed the most commonly
identified alternatives for resolution of the obsolescence
problem, and presented a decision model to assist with alterna-
tive selection. All possible alternatives have not been included,
and discussions have been general and relatively brief. It is
suggested that further research:
1. Identify additional alternatives to the obsolescence
problem,
2. Expand upon the discussions of each alternative.
This study has described the procedures that NAVAIR developed
to approach the obsolescence problem, and the internal selection
process. Further research could be directed toward:
1. Examining procedures other systems commands have
implemented,
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2. The development of internal selection processes which
assure that sufficient analysis is conducted, and that
a uniform decision is made and implemented.
This study has presented a decision model which does not
consider many incremental aspects of particular situations.
For example, time is either short or long. Many decisions
could be affected by the inclusion of additional time, stability,
cost, quantity, and complexity considerations. The model has
other simplifying characteristics which could be revised to
incorporate additional complexity. Suggestions for further
research include:
1. Identify additional circumstantial factors whose
combined consideration will affect alternative selection,
2. Conduct an in-depth analysis of the weighting scheme to
determine if the (+) , (-) , (0) scheme is most appro-
priate, and whether the weights have been assigned in
the most appropriate manner.
3. Determine a decision thought process which will objec-
tively result in the ultimate selection of only one
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